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JAPANESE EMIGRATION TO CHINA

BY

TA CHEN, A. M.,

Sometime Fellow of Columbia University



Published by the Chinese Patriotic Committee
of New York City

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
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と云ふことになつたのであります。之を主體にせなければならぬと云ふことに極まつた譯は、先づ其當時の總理大臣西園寺侯も其他の人も文裝的武備と云ふ私の意見を容れられたからであります。そこで文裝的武備とは一寸言つて見ると文事的施設を以て他の侵略に備へ一旦緩急あれば武斷的行動を助くるの便を併せて講し置く事でありす、例之病院を置くそれを戰時のときは軍團病院に便ふ、又鐵道の吏員は軍事に差支のないやうにする爲めに武官の人で、鐵道會社に命令を奉じて常に鐵道内部の設備に留意し有事の日に差支無き様仕組み置くことになつて居りましたが、段々それが壞れて營業一方に傾き遂に今日の狀態になつたのであります。その文裝的武備と云ふことが何處迄も最も必要であります。そこで港の事に付いて港務局を置く時は海軍軍人の豫備若くは現役に在る者にしてコンマンジorenされた者を用ゆることにしたいと云ふ要求を出しました。此主義を政府が容れなければ私はお斷りをするまでと決心して居る故に何んでも言ふて行はれないことはなかつたが、三ヶ月計り立つと段々變つて來て私に職中にも已に最初とは趣を異にするやうになりまして、今日は最早前日の態がなくなつたのであります。斯の如くにして帝國の特殊なる南滿鐵道に對するの使命を完うすることが出来るや否やと云ふことが問題として御攻究を願ひたい、是れが爲めに私は此事を申し上げて置くのであります。

滿鐵の目
的的の點

Baron Shimpei Goto in his secret document on "General Policies of Japanese Emigration" outlines his policy of the "Peacefully Disguised Military Preparedness" and intends to make Manchuria a military colony of the Japanese Empire.



This map is taken from one of the confidential reports of the Japanese General Staff. This portion shows parts of Manchuria, the Gulf of Liao Tung and East Inner Mongolia. Experts of military tactics have surveyed these regions thoroughly. Their southern route is indicated by a dotted line (-----), and their central route by a solid line (—————). Thirty-seven towns and villages in Manchuria and East Inner Mongolia now have resident Japanese military officers and reserve soldiers.



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THE ISSUE

Japan has repeatedly contended that her policy of commercial and industrial expansion is based on an economic necessity, as she must find outlets for her surplus population. This short essay will refute her argument by showing:

(1) That Japan's emigration policies for Manchuria and Mongolia are dominated by military, political and territorial considerations. Japanese official documents, confidential reports and other authoritative declarations and statements are freely used in order to get evidence "out of their own mouths." Such evidence is introduced into the English language for the first time.

(2) That economic activities of Japanese immigrants in China are usually interwoven with politics to disturb peace and order. In purely commercial and industrial undertakings, many Japanese have not had great economic successes as they have emigrated to places of higher density and lower plane of living.

(3) That immoral acts of Japanese in China are calculated to demoralize and to denationalize the Chinese people.

I Japan's Emigration Policies for Manchuria and Mongolia.

1) Baron Goto's policy of the "Peacefully Disguised Military Preparedness."

Baron Shimpei Goto, for many years Civil Governor of Taiwan and the most experienced colonial administrator of Japan, has laid the cornerstone of her emigration policies for the Far East in general and for China in particular. On accepting the position as the first Director General of the South Manchuria Railway Administration, the Baron outlines his emigration policy known as the "Peacefully Disguised Military Preparedness" in a series of correspondence with Prince Yamagata, Saionji, (Prime Minister) Hayashi (Foreign Minister) Sakuma, (Governor of Taiwan) and Oshima (Governor General of Kwantung, Manchuria). This series is printed in a booklet for confidential circulation, and the printing "is only

to save the trouble of copying." Pages 55-56 of this booklet are reproduced in a photograph on the front page of this pamphlet.

The booklet is entitled "General Policies of Japan's Emigration" and portions of the Baron's address at the Saiwai Club, an organization of the House of Peers, on June 5, 1914, are hereafter translated:

(a) The Peacefully Disguised Military Preparedness.

"Prime Minister Saionji and other important officials of our government have approved my emigration policy to Manchuria, known as the 'Peacefully Disguised Military Preparedness.' This policy advocates preparations for war in time of peace, so that when emergency rises military activities may at once be ready. Such a scheme is very convenient for military operations. I will now give some examples. When we open hospitals in Manchuria, it should be planned that every one of them may be used as a military hospital. (On page 121 of his booklet, the Baron explains this by saying that there should be large porches to every hospital, so that a large number of beds for wounded soldiers may be placed on each porch. Today all Japanese hospitals in South Manchuria have extremely large porches.) Take another example. Railway employees in Manchuria should also be military officers. They should take orders from their superior officers to see to it that the internal organization of the railway administration is amply prepared for military emergencies. In fact, military preparedness is necessary in all parts of Manchuria and at all times. A third example refers to the ports in South Manchuria. The employees of the Bureau of Ports should be navy men, so that they can be of service in naval conflicts."¹

"This policy has been approved by our government," says the Baron, and it may be added that it is strictly enforced and enlarged to the present day. The only important change is that the Director General of the South Manchuria Railway Administration is not a military officer as the Baron first suggested. This change is made in order to avoid suspicion from other trading nations in the territory.

(b) Emigrants and their Equipment.

"Permanent victory in Manchuria," declares Baron Goto, "largely depends upon an increase in population in Japanese

¹ General Policies of Japanese Emigration p. 55 ff.

colonies. German inhabitants in Alsace-Lorraine played no small part in winning for Germany the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. If Japan has 500,000 emigrants in Manchuria, and several millions of horses, mules, and other domestic animals, they would be of great use in case of war. If in such a war, opportunities are favorable to Japan, they can be armed at once to attack our enemy. If opportunities are unfavorable, they can also be used to maintain strongholds for negotiating peace. The 'Peacefully Disguised Military Preparedness' thus forms my main policy in colonizing Manchuria and Korea. In brief, this emigration policy is 'to practice the doctrine of Par in the name of Wong.'"²

(The Baron is using a maxim of Chinese political philosophy. The doctrine of Wong stresses virtue, culture, and benevolence, while that of Par, force and conquest. For example, the enlightened Emperors of the Chow Dynasty were said to have practiced the imperial ways of Wong, whereas its usurping vassals that of Par. Baron Goto insists that in the name of virtue and culture, Japan should plan military conquests in China.)

(c) Harmony in Colonial Administration in Manchuria.

The Baron foresees possible conflict and friction between civil and military officers in Manchuria, and suggests methods of "mediation and conciliation." "Regarding the organization of the army and plans of mobilization, there are definite rules and regulations which must be strictly observed and enforced by the South Manchuria Railway Administration. To avoid misunderstanding and facilitate co-operation, the head of the Japanese government and the Director General of the administration should have a thorough understanding of the Peacefully Disguised Military Preparedness. They should be unanimous in their opinions and definite in their policies in order to assure a successful emigration to Manchuria."³

2) Plan of the General Staff.

A) A general scheme.

(a) To extend military influence.

Recently, the General Staff of Japan has published a "Special Number" for confidential circulation outlining its emigration policies in Manchuria and Mongolia. Important passages are translated as follows:

² General Policies of Japanese Emigration p. 65 ff.

³ General Policies of Japanese Emigration p. 108 ff.

"In North Mongolia Russia's military influences is pre-dominant. The rapid increase in population in Japanese settlements near Cheng Chia Tun is also due to the Japanese military power in the territory. It must be clearly understood that Japan's policy in dealing with Mongolia and China must be different from that with western nations. Since Tao-Nan, Kero, Lingsi, Chi-Fun and other towns are important for Japanese emigrants, Japan must at the earliest possible moment dispatch troops in the name of protecting Japanese consulates and its branches.

"Besides, Japan may rely upon a noteworthy precedent for her military occupation, namely, the murder of German missionaries in Kiaochow was seized by Germany as a pretext for the lease of Kiaochow. Recently, the killing of Japanese guards by bandits at Cheng Chia Tun is an excellent opportunity for stationing additional troops there.

"As Chinese troops and police are not sufficient to protect the community from attacks by horse bandits, Japan may increase the numerical strength of the South Manchurian guards and send them to new places of Japanese emigrants."

At another place, the General Staff deems it necessary to have resident military officers at Lingsi, and Chi-Fun in order to "demonstrate Japan's national power to foreigners, Mongolians and Chinese," so as "to undermine their influence on the one hand and to build up Japanese influence on the other."

(b) To make secret agreements with Mongolian and Chinese officials.

"As Chinese officials and Mongolian royalty are having financial difficulties, Japan should enter secret agreements and form an intimate relationship with them in order to provide them with money for the development of commerce and industry.

(c) To open Japanese schools, charitable organizations and hospitals.

"These are necessary in order that the natives may be assimilated to Japanese culture gradually and unconsciously.

(d) To supply arms and munitions.

"Japan should decorate old rifles, guns and machine guns and sell them to Mongolians at reduced rates. This will strengthen her political influence there. Before the war Ger-

many used to supply Mongolia with guns manufactured in 1888. This cunning policy should be adopted by Japan.”⁵

B) Methods of Emigration.

Following general principles laid down by the General Staff, there is a certain definite procedure of Japanese emigration to Mongolia.

(a) “Let reserve soldiers be first dispatched to such places as Kero, Tao-Nan, Lingsi, Chi-Fun and neighboring communities as emigrants, to be engaged in agriculture, pasturage, or industries. If they are attacked by horse bandits, they can defend themselves.

(b) “In the name of protecting these emigrants, Japanese consulates should place reserve soldiers in strategical points.

(c) “Chinese officials should be required to bear responsibility of protecting these emigrants. In case of murder or other important damages incurred to the Japanese, indemnity should be exacted from the Chinese.”⁶

C) Inducements to Japanese Emigrants.

To induce home seekers to Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, the Japanese Government gives them special privileges, which are far more liberal than those given by emigration companies to Slavic emigrants to the United States, or contracted Chinese laborers to the Transvaal in the Unionist Administration of England. The Japanese Government does it at a great financial sacrifice in order to gain political influence in Eastern Mongolia.

(a) “The Japanese Government will loan money to farmers at a low rate of interest, give them lands, and special rates for transportation and lodging. In cases of necessity, the government will loan them farming implements, domestic animals and arms for self-protection.

(b) “Regarding commercial and industrial enterprises which concern national welfare or relate to international competition, loans will be made on applications at a low rate of interest. Without doubt, other government assistance will be given in order to assure commercial success of emigrants at an earliest possible moment.

(c) “Koreans have low plane of living and low wages. Their experience and efficiency in rice growing almost equals to that of Chinese farmers. The Japanese Government should

⁵ Pp. 17-18.

⁶ P. 19.

induce Koreans to emigrate to Eastern Mongolia in order to resist Chinese emigration from the south and to give room for Japanese emigration to Korea. Up to the end of 1914, Korean emigrants in Mongolia already amounted to 300,000 and their number is rapidly increasing.”⁷

Furthermore, Dr. Henry Chung, a Korean liberalist, has declared that Japan encourages Koreans to emigrate to Manchuria and Mongolia in order that “she may have a claim on these regions on the pretext of ‘protecting’ her Korean subjects and station her soldiers by what is known as ‘Infiltration Tactics’.”⁸

But the sufferings and hardships that the Korean emigrants have undergone in this compulsory exodus are truly unbearable:

“The untold afflictions of the Korean immigrants coming into Manchuria will, doubtless, never be fully realized, even by those actually witnessing their distress. In the still closeness of a forty below zero climate in the dead of winter, the silent stream of white clad figures creeps over the icy mountain passes, in groups of ten, twenties and fifties, seeking a new world of subsistence, willing to take a chance of life and death in a hand-to-hand struggle with the stubborn soil of Manchuria’s wooded and stony hillsides. Here, by indefatigable efforts, they seek to extract a living by applying the grub ax and hand hoe to the barren mountain sides above the Chinese fields, planting and reaping by hand, between roots, the sparse yield that is often insufficient to sustain life.

“Many have died from insufficient food. Not only women and children, but young men have been frozen to death. Sick-ness also claims its toll under these new conditions of exposure. Koreans have been seen standing barefooted on the broken ice of a riverside fording place, rolling up their baggy trousers before wading through the broad stream, two feet deep, of ice cold water, then standing on the opposite side while they hastily adjust their clothing and shoes.

“Women with insufficient clothing and parts of their bodies exposed, carry little children on their backs, thus creating mutual warmth in a slight degree, but it is in this way that the little one’s feet, sticking out from the binding basket, get frozen and afterwards fester till the tiny toes stick together.

⁷ P. 25.

⁸ The Case of Korea, 1921, p. 115.

Old men and women, with bent backs and wrinkled faces, walk the uncomplaining miles until their old limbs refuse to carry them further.

"Thus it is by households they come, old and young, weak and strong, big and little. . . .

"In this way over 75,000 Koreans have entered during the past year, until the number of Koreans now living in both the north and western portions of Manchuria now totals nearly half a million."

D) A summary.

Hidden motives of Japanese emigration to Manchuria and Mongolia are thus revealed by a review of Japanese authorities.

Japan aims at making Manchuria a military colony, as she is employing military men in the South Manchurian Railway Administration, as railway guards, and navy men at sea-ports. Special privileges are given to emigrants of military training.

Recently, she has repeatedly insisted on spreading Japanese culture in her colonies, especially in Mongolia. This is to be done by three main methods: to extend her military power, to discredit and check Chinese influence and to enter into secret agreements with Mongolian nobility for the sole benefits of the Mikado.

II. Japanese Emigrants and their Economic Activities.

1) Population, density and Japanese emigrants in Manchuria. Manchuria has an area of 92,000 square miles and 20,122,000 people of which 19,639,700 are Chinese and 473,500 foreigners. In other words, in a territory of a little larger than the State of Oregon live about 25 times as many inhabitants. The annual rate of increase of population in Mukden province is 3.5%, in Kirin, 8.8% and in Hei Lung Kiang, 4.5%; whereas the annual rate of increase in Japan Proper is only 1.50% and in the United States, 1.90%.

Obviously, Manchuria offers no great inducements to Japanese emigrants. In fact, the Bank of Chosen, under Japanese management and control, frankly states that "Manchuria is well inhabited, and does not leave much room for immigration."¹⁰

⁹ Report to the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions.

¹⁰ Economic History of Manchuria, 1921, pp. 130-131.

Yet, the Japanese population in Manchuria has been on the increase in recent years, especially since the European war, as the following table will show:¹¹

Year	Japanese in Manchuria
1910.....	62,627
1911.....	19,087
1912.....	38,357
1913.....	87,494
1914.....	95,352
1915.....	95,352
1916.....	102,759
1917.....	104,834
1918.....	112,474
1919.....	122,367
1920.....	156,079

The largest drop occurred in year 1911 which was due to a severe bubonic plague in Manchuria. Since that year the increase in numbers has been steady and continuous. In addition, it must be added about 40,000 Japanese soldiers in various parts of Manchuria.

Regarding the question of density, comparisons are made between populousness in home communities of Japanese emigrants and in their new homes in Manchuria. In Table 1, the Japanese Bureau of Colonization shows that eleven Japanese communities send their sons and daughters to Manchuria to the number of 500 persons or more per year. Most of them go to the Japanese settlements in Dairen, Port Arthur and neighboring villages.

Table 2 shows the number of Japanese and Chinese in seventeen Manchurian towns and villages. The majority of the Japanese have come from some of the Japanese communities shown in Table 1.

It is clearly seen that with the exception of Tokio-fu and Osaka-fu which have densities of 1,357 and 1,158 persons per square mile, the remaining Japanese have emigrated from places of relatively lower density to those of higher density.

The Japanese argument that her emigration to China is to relieve her population pressure seems to have broken down completely.

¹¹ Statistical Annual of the Imperial Cabinet of Japan.

Furthermore, Table 3 shows a Japanese estimate of the rate of increase in density in Manchurian and Mongolian communities up to 1928. This rate far exceeds the acreage of arable land that may be opened for cultivation. At present, the cultivated lands (in mow) ¹⁴ in districts where there are considerable number of Japanese are as follows: ¹⁵

Mukden	45,194,175
Kirin	85,985,768
Hei Lung Kiang	37,165,014
Shantung	127,097,587
Fukien	24,313,431
Jehol	16,895,322

TABLE 1

DENSITY OF EMIGRANTS' HOME COMMUNITIES IN JAPAN ¹⁶

	per year No. of emigrants	Density per sq. mile
Aichi	607	59.72
Oita	777	65.00
Ehime	591	108.45
Hiroshima	1,395	115.75
Kayoshima	730	105.08
Kioto	621	118.00
Kumamoto	861	78.95
Nagasaki	1,488	98.70
Okayama	530	100.00
Osaka	1,262	1,158.00
Tokio	1,557	1,375.00

¹⁴ One mow=1/6 acre.

¹⁵ The Sixth Annual Report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Peking.

¹⁶ Bureau of Colonization, Tokyo.

TABLE 2

JAPANESE AND CHINESE IN MANCHURIAN COMMUNITIES
SHOWING DENSITY PER SQUARE RI AND PER SQUARE MILE

	Japanese	Chinese	Density per sq. ri	per sq. mile ¹⁷
Antung	1,636	1,211	2,564	427.33
Chan Chun . .	4,076	10,453	3,295	549.16
Chang Tu . . .	482	1,387	1,821	303.50
Feng Chen . .	848	638	1,540	256.66
Fu Hsten . . .	1,573	2,016	2,005	334.16
Fu Shun	8,336	15,749	2,450	408.33
Hai Chen . . .	451	208	1,875	312.50
Hui Teh	2,263	5,759	2,266	377.66
Kai P'ing . . .	679	2,464	1,985	330.83
Kai Yuan . . .	1,239	8,579	1,190	198.33
Kwantung . . .	6,731	2,519	2,470	411.66
Li Shu	1,120	7,093	1,997	332.83
Liao Yang . . .	3,533	1,749	2,991	498.50
Peng Chih . . .	2,333	867	1,867	311.16
Shen Yang . .	5,557	3,937	3,001	500.00
T'ieh Ling . . .	1,549	433	1,829	304.83
Yin Kow	1,785	561	2,500	416.66

¹⁷ 1 sq. ri=5.96 sq. mile. Here it is divided by 6.

TABLE 3
ESTIMATE OF INCREASE IN DENSITY IN MANCHURIA AND EASTERN MONGOLIA PER
SQUARE RI

	1916	1920	1924	1928	actual increase	per cent increase
South Manchuria (Section 1)	1,267	1,333	1,401	1,473	206	16.25
South Manchuria (Section 2)	142	160	186	217	75	15.28
Chien Tao	159	175	194	213	54	33.96
Total	650	690	735	782	132	20.30
North Manchuria (Section 1)	382	458	534	610	228	59.68
North Manchuria (Section 2)	33	39	46	55	22	66.66
Hei Lung Kiang	13	15	16	17	4	30.76
Total	118	141	165	189	71	60.16
Liao Hsi and Ichol	606	633	661	691	85	14.02
Grand total	335	364	395	427	92	27.46

Report on population, land and agricultural products in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, published by the South Manchuria Railway Administration, 1919, p. 83.

2) Economic Clash.

The great influx of Japanese into Manchuria has intensified the struggle for existence and has forced many Chinese out of various occupations. For example, the Great Guild of Newchwang, Mukden Province, embodies influential banks and commercial enterprises in the city, and controls labor and trade for decades. In recent years, Japanese of different professions have been displacing the Chinese at a rapid rate. Likewise, the Yalu Lumber Company was reorganized into a Sino-Japanese joint corporation by the Yuan-Komura secret agreement of 1905. The dividends of the company decreased year after year, and the Chinese stockholders were forced to sell their shares to the Japanese in order to escape an impending bankruptcy. The Japanese in the company manipulated the company's finances, and also forced the Chinese employees out of employment. Economic competition in Manchuria has resulted in the displacement of one people by another.

3) Social undesirability of Japanese in Manchuria.

The Japanese in Manchuria constitute serious social problems to the Chinese people. In Chang Chun, only the Japanese employees of the South Manchuria Railway, the Mitsui Company and two or three other commercial enterprises have regular occupations. The remaining Japanese in the settlement are engaged in businesses of questionable character and make a total profit of about 1,000,000 yen per year.¹²

Among the 156,079 Japanese in Manchuria in 1920, 2,813 had no occupations, and only 1,323 were engaged in agriculture, pasturage, forestry or fishery.¹³ It is thus clear that the Japanese in constructive industries are strikingly few, consequently they do not materially contribute social wealth to Chinese communities. Among those who have no occupations there is an enormous number of Ronin who frequently create troubles of various kinds to enable Japan to extend the sphere of Japanese consular jurisdiction and to infringe China's sovereignty.

¹² "Manchurian and Mongolian Affairs," serial No. 5, p. 40, Governor General's Office of Kwantung.

¹³ See table 4 on p. 19.

TABLE 4

JAPANESE EMIGRANTS IN MANCHURIA, SHANTUNG AND FUKIEN BY OCCUPATIONS
(for 1920)¹⁸

	Antung, Hun Chun, and vicinity		Kwantung and vicinity		Yinkow, Newchwang, and vicinity		Chang Chun Harbin, Cheng Chia Tun		Tsingtao		Tsinan, Foochow, Chefoo, Amoy, Lungkow Swatow				
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F			
Farmers, Shepherds, I Foresters Fishermen	44	1,017	268	2	42	2	8	...	624	3
Miners and II Industrial Workers	654	14	23,034	6,981	53	1,046	33	11	2	1,373	86	124	6	51
Merchants and III Transportation Agents	1,897	68	23,685	8,031	446	4,823	314	103	8	5,807	245	584	32	303
Public Service men and IV Independent Enterprisers	818	60	3,782	1,287	376	588	96	17	3	1,709	162	152	31	135
Other Occupa- V tions	883	484	8,874	971	1,602	492	1,799	10	39	1,373	1,587	92	197	100
No Occupation or VI Occupations Already terminated	33	34	1,592	495	437	132	59	25	2	4	94	61	14	4	15
Their Family VII Members	1,948	4,115	43,193	9,139	19,101	2,661	5,314	31	111	3,959	9,979	374	892	187
Total	6,277	4,775	61,984	43,688	21,712	9,711	9,711	7,583	182	107	14,999	12,123	1,340	1,162	798

¹⁸ Statistical Annual of the Imperial Cabinet of Japan.

When Papuchapa, a notorious Mongolian bandit, has recently assisted Prince Su in attempting to restore the Manchu Throne in China, many Japanese in Manchuria secretly helped him. When Okuma was at the height of his political activities, the Japanese in Manchuria were ordered to assist horse bandits by supplying them with food, arms and munitions. The Japanese in Manchuria are disturbers of law and peace, and should not be permitted to live there permanently.

But more Japanese are coming, and China must be prepared for the worst. Basing on an estimate of arable land in Manchuria, the Bureau of Colonization has recently planned to send 300,000 Japanese emigrants to Mukden Province, 3,500,000 to Kirin and 6,000,000 to Hei Lung Kiang.

4) Japanese emigration an economic failure.

The South Manchuria Railway has recently made a cost-of-living survey of the farmers in about one hundred villages in the "railway zone" under Japanese consular jurisdiction. The study covers such items as food, clothing, fuel, education, heat and light and miscellaneous expenses. It is found that on the average, a small farmer in Manchuria spends 7.44 yen for food per year less than a farmer of the same class in Japan; and a middle class farmer in Manchuria spends 15.30 yen less than one in Japan. This relatively lower standard of living in Manchuria has worked hardship on the Japanese in that territory and has given rise to the "pessimistic view of Japanese agricultural emigration to Manchuria."¹⁰

Besides, the Japanese emigrants to Manchuria have really moved from a relatively higher wage level to a lower level, as the following table will show:

Occupations	Dairen (daily wage in yen)	Japan (average daily wage in yen)
Blacksmiths	.33	.91
Bricklayers	.30	1.22
Carpenters	.50	.97
Day laborers	.30	.70
Painters	.40	.85
Stone cutters	.50	1.11
Tile roofers	.44	.99
Tailors	.50	.79-97

¹⁰ The Keizai Ronso, vol. VIII, No. 3, 427-433.

Even giving some allowance to small differences in living cost in these two regions, the Japanese in Manchurian towns are receiving much lower wages than their brethren in the same occupations in the Island Empire.

These facts again tend to show that Japanese immigrants in Manchuria are not improving their socio-economic conditions in any material way. How can it be seriously maintained that Japan's policy of commercial and industrial expansion by means of a mass emigration can relieve economic pressure at home?

In spite of strenuous efforts of the Japanese Government to induce her nationals to make homes in Manchuria and Mongolia, the experiment is a failure. The Oriental Development Company, with a capital of 10,000,000 yen and a government subsidy of 500,000 yen per year, is one of the largest emigration companies for Manchuria and Mongolia. Yet in ten years, namely, from 1907 to 1916, the company has emigrated only 4,000 families. "It is clearly seen," comments the General Staff, "that the argument of getting an outlet for our surplus population is farcial."²⁰

5) Sino-Japanese joint enterprises.

In Manchuria and Mongolia there are 29 Sino-Japanese joint enterprises, each having a capital of 100,000 yen or more. Without a single exception, the Japanese shareholders in the company dominate and control its business. The reason for this state of affairs must be explained by the Japanese themselves.

Commenting on the large number of Chinese farmers who are cultivating lands near Jehol and in the valleys of the Sungari, the General Staff advises the Japanese to penetrate into the territory by first making friends with the Chinese. "Sino-Japanese joint enterprise must be encouraged. Practically the Japanese always control them, but it is necessary to give the Chinese the name of their participation in order to assure a great success in agriculture. In Liao Tung peninsula and in Tsingtao, many cases of real estate are jointly managed by Japanese and Chinese. These contracts are invariably in favor of Japanese."

At another place, the General Staff advises the Japanese to be "tactful" in making joint contracts with the Chinese, especially after the pro-Japanese leader in the Chinese cab-

²⁰ Affairs in Eastern Mongolia, p. 21.

inet and other important officials have been denounced by the Chinese as traitors.

"Indeed," continues the General Staff, "public sentiment is so violently against Japan's aggressiveness that the inhabitants of Chi-Fun and Kero of small means do not dare to cooperate with the Japanese in business, fearing that they too might be called traitors. But means must be found to form Sino-Japanese emigration bureaus."

6) Japanese monopoly of agriculture.

Military considerations of Japanese emigration have been sketched; her economic motives will now be scrutinized. Chief agricultural products in districts which Japanese emigrants are trying to monopolize are shown in Table 5. Before long, Chinese farmers in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia will be driven out of employment by the Japanese competitors. On this point, let Japan speak for herself:

TABLE 5
CHIEF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS OF MANCHURIA JEHOI, SHANTUNG
AND FUKIEN ²¹

	(in piculs) ²²			
	Rice	Wheat	Soya Beans	Millet Maize
Mukden	875,863	1,014,788	3,610,697	27,644,769 3,287,928
Kirin	439,887	3,695,997	5,026,975	2,609,144 1,234,266
Hei Lung Kiang ...	139,351	5,111,567	4,995,610	1,864,315 1,971,018
Jehol	10,273	267,326	354,235	2,672,827 94,633
Shantung	1,198,586	15,705,995	12,249,523	12,403,545 3,287,522
Fukien	26,652,560	4,542,674	803,765	9,156 2,015

²¹ The Sixth Annual Report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, published in Peking, August, 1920.

²² One picul=133 1-3 pounds.

"The Sungari and the Liao Valleys are the most fertile lands in Manchuria. Japanese farmers should centre around these places. Lands in Chang Chun and Kirin are particularly suited for agriculture, and Japan should at once increase her population there. The upper course of the Liao and the south bed of the Silamolán, namely the valley within the jurisdiction of Jehol, is colonized by Chinese emigrants.

"But north of the T'ung river, lands are mostly uncultivated. The farther north one goes the more uncultivated lands he finds. Rich and natural pastures are in abundance. Here should be the centre of Japanese emigrants. They should prevent Chinese and Mongolians from coming north. Japan should keep this most fertile region for herself and for no others.

"Other sections of Jehol are now cultivated by Chinese. The Japanese should go in and compete with them. For this purpose, special financial institutions must be created to facilitate Japanese agricultural emigration."²³

7) Japanese railways of political and military importance.

Aside from the South Manchurian railway, the Ssu Ping Kai—Cheng Chia Tun line of 52 miles traverses valleys of high density and fertile soil. It is an enormous economic success, as well as a help in strengthening Japanese influence in South Manchuria.

The Tao Nan and Cheng Chia Tun line of 140 miles is the first step of building up Japanese political domination in Manchuria against Russian influence in North Manchuria. Friction between Japanese and Chinese authorities is frequent, resulting in a material infringement of China's sovereignty.

The Cheng Chia Tun and Kero line of 150 miles serves to transport Mongolian products such as soya beans and cereals to Manchuria. Japan is planning to extend the line westward to strengthen her military control in Outer Mongolia. Japanese soldiers are stationed under the pretext of preserving peace in the province. Port Arthur and Dairen are well fortified and heavily mined.

8) Japanese Emigration to Shantung.

Shantung is far more crowded than Manchuria. Not quite as large as Illinois, Shantung supports about six times as many people. In other words, within the boundaries of 55,980 square miles, 29,600,000 souls are swarming.

²³ Affairs in Eastern Mongolia, pp. 43-44.

The density of the province is 528 persons to a square mile, being the highest in all China. Most Japanese in Shantung have come from Kioto-fu and Nagasaki-ken whose densities are 118 and 98.7 per square mile respectively. Thus the Japanese have moved to Shantung where the struggle for existence is appreciably severer than in their home towns; yet they are telling the world that they are solving their surplus population problem!

In describing a congested section in Shantung, Prof. F. H. King says: "One square mile of soil is supporting 3,072 persons, 256 cows, 256 donkeys and 512 pigs."²⁴ Is the province not a human beehive? Has it room for Japanese emigrants?

The influx of Japanese into the peninsula has been continuous, especially since the Japanese occupancy of Tsingtao. In recent years the Japanese population in Shantung is tabulated as follows: ²⁵

1910.....	616
1911.....	not reported
1912.....	683
1913.....	749
1914.....	967
1915.....	967
1916.....	2,335
1917.....	4,880
1918.....	24,160
1919.....	28,704
1920.....	29,988

a) Economic Competition.

Like in Manchuria, the Japanese in Shantung have gradually forced the Chinese out of employment from various occupations. The Shantung strawbraid, chiefly exported to the United States for hat and basket making, is produced in northern Shantung, especially in Yangshin, Saho, Changyi and Sai-chow. The trade was formerly monopolized by the Chinese in Laichow and Tengchow. Today, the splitting of the straw the plaiting of the braid is rapidly falling into the hands of the Japanese in the province. During the Germany occupancy of Kiochow, supervisors, section hands, skilled and unskilled workers in mines, railways, machine shops and companies

²⁴ Farmers of Forty Centuries.

²⁵ Statistical Annual of the Imperial Cabinet of Japan, Tokio.

were largely recruited from the native population. Today, the Japanese are rapidly filling up these occupations.

b) Strategical Location of Tsingtao.

Japanese are attracted to Shantung not so much by economic opportunities as by strategical position of the peninsula and Kiaochow Bay. Their permanent occupation of the bay deprives of China the only suitable naval base in the Yellow Sea, thus leaving China's coastal trade protectionless and national safety endangered.

The strategical location of Tsingtao may be roughly compared with that of New York Harbor. If Cuba, in the future, should become a powerful State and be hostile to the United States, no American citizen would permit Cuba to maintain a stronghold in the harbor. The Japanese occupancy of Tsingtao is indeed a constant menace to the integrity and security of the Chinese nation.

The port of New York is a great commercial gateway, connecting New England ports in the north with Atlantic ports in the south, and draws to it all the trade from great neighboring towns. Tsingtao connects Tientsin in the north with Shanghai in the south and draws to it 95% of the trade in Shantung. Why should a port of such strategical and commercial importance be under the exclusive control of a foreign power, especially an enemy nation as Japan?

9) Japanese Emigration to Fukien.

Fukien offers little inducements to Japanese emigrants. Within an area of 46,332 square miles live 13,100 people, or with an area of about the State of Mississippi seven times as many inhabitants are herded together. The struggle for life keeps Japanese emigrants to the province down to the lowest possible numbers. From 1910 to 1920 the Japanese population in Amoy and Foochow is as follows:

1910.....	603
1911.....	2,009 ²⁶
1912.....	338
1913.....	436
1914.....	407
1915.....	403
1916.....	450
1917.....	546

²⁶ Due to a bubonic plague in Manchuria in that year, many Japanese came to Fukien.

1918.....	614
1919.....	687
1920.....	753

“Floating population” figures prominently in the Japanese communities, as the province is separated from Formosa only by a narrow strait. Japanese subjects in Formosa come to Amoy to be temporarily engaged in houses of ill-fame, lottery tickets and opium smuggling. Whenever they are in danger of being arrested by Chinese authorities, they sail for Formosa.

Another strong reason for the small number of Japanese immigrants in the province is the unsatisfactory social conditions in the circuit of Amoy and its vicinity. Since the war, the cost of living in China has materially increased in many cities. But in Amoy the increase in wages since 1914 is less than 30%, and thus creates maladjustments among working classes. This constitutes a chief drawback to Japanese colonizers. Daily wages of some occupations in Amoy are shown below:

Industry and occupation	Daily wage and board. (1921) ²⁷	
Bricklayers, men.....	\$0.52-\$0.87	
Candle makers:		
Men21-	.61
Women09-	.26
Carpenters:		
Men43-	.87
Children09-	.26
Chair coolies, men.....		.26
Common laborers:		
Men26-	.44
Women17-	.34
Children10-	.17
Dyers, men.....	.17-	.44
Engine drivers, marine, men.....	.67-	1.33
Farmers:		
Men26-	.52
Women17-	.35
Firecracker makers:		
Men35-	.70
Women13-	.35
Children10-	.26

²⁷ See the author's paper in the Monthly Labor Review, August, 1921, p. 14-15.

Gardeners, men.....	.40-	.53
Gold and silver smiths, men.....	.44-	.87
Machinists, men.....	.61-	1.74
Masons:		
Men61-	.87
Children26-	.35
Painters, children.....	.26-	.35
Paper lantern makers, men.....	.17-	.44
Policemen (at Kulangsu).....	.20-	.35
Painters:		
Men44-	.52
Children26-	.35
Quarrymen and stonecutters:		
Men52-	1.31
Children26-	.44
Sampan (boatman).....	.44-	.87
Shipbuilders, men.....	.61-	1.74
Shoemakers, men.....	.13-	.35
Sock and towel makers, women...	.17-	.61
Tailors:		
Men26-	.44
Women17-	.35
Tea packers, men.....	.44-	.87
Tea pickers:		
Men44-	.87
Women13-	.20
Children10-	.17

III. Demoralizing Influence of Japanese in China.

1) Opium and Morphine Smuggling.

Three main routes of opium smuggling from Japan to China may be described. Opium enters Manchuria and other adjoining territories by way of Dairen, mainly through Japanese mails, as Chinese officials have no right to inspect mail bags in Japanese settlements. In central China, opium is shipped from Kobe to Tsingtao, and there it is distributed in Shantung province and the Yangtse valley. In 1915 China was forced to agree that Japanese commodities landed in the part of Tsingtao on "certificate of Government" should be free from examination by customs officers. Morphine is smuggled into South China by means of motor boats from Formosa. The drug is retailed through the southern provinces by Japanese and Chinese peddlers, each of whom carrying a passport

certifying that he is a citizen of Formosa, which renders the Chinese officials powerless to punish him.

Since the European war, the amount of opium illegally imported to all Chinese ports has averaged about thirty tons per year, and up to the end of 1920, about 30,000,000 people have been affected by the narcotic. The Japanese Government levies a tax on opium at the rate of 4,000 taels per chest. Basing on an estimate of 5,000 chests per year, the Japanese Government derives an annual revenue of not less than \$20,000,000.

2) The Opium Scandal in Port Arthur.

A notorious opium scandal involving eleven prominent Japanese happened in Port Arthur in July, 1921. The accused Japanese included Renzo Koga, formerly chief of the bureau of colonization, a district attorney, several police officers and members of the Kwantung government. The case was tried in the preliminary court of Port Arthur under Justice Hisamatsu Takahashi, who reported it to the District Court of Port Arthur covering 3,200 pages. The Japan Times and Mail gives the following summary:

“A Dairen society called Kosai Zendo, was recognized as a charity institution, whose business is to render charity and also to work to cut out the practice of the use of opium. The directors were appointed by the Kuantung government from the names recommended by the civil administrator in Dairen. The society was then empowered to import and distribute opium to retailers. Persian opium was sold at prices permitted by the civil administrator of Dairen and confiscated opium of another make was sold at prices determined from time to time by the civil administrator. Any net proceeds after all expenses of the society were met were to be handed over through the Dairen administration to the Kuantung government in Port Arthur. Thus, in reality the opium section of the Kosai Zendo has come to have nothing whatever to do with the Kosai Zendo itself, as the opium section was now controlled by the Japanese administrators.

“But they did not do their duty properly and honestly. One of the accused, Mizuho Esaki, believing that there were plenty of profits to be realized from the opium deal, consulted with another accused, Sei Kazui, about the prospects. The third man, Motosuke Kanbara, was acquainted with affairs of the Kuantung peninsula, but had no acquaintance among high government officials in Kuantung peninsula, and was waiting

for an opportunity. Then came the fourth man, Yuko Nakano, a close friend and a sort of protege of Renzo Koga, former chief of the colonization bureau. Nakano was the civil administrator of Tsingtao before and was later shifted to Dairen as the civil administrator there. Early in February, 1919, before he went to Dairen, he came to Tokio. Sei Kazui was known to Renzo Koga, the fifth man accused. Seeing that Nakano might serve his purpose, Kazui consulted Renzo Koga about securing official sales of opium in Dairen. He requested Koga to use his influence to see that Nakano be instructed to permit such sales to himself. Kanbara, also known to Koga, consulted his protege about the same thing. Koga complied with their requests. Nakano was persuaded by Koga to use his official power in Dairen to accommodate the intending opium dealers.

"As soon as Nakano went to Dairen as the civil administrator in February, 1919, he conspired with Kazui, Endo, and Obata, and Esaka was called upon to act together with Kuniyeda to engage in a joint business with the Chinese dealers. The clique then secured opium at less than one-half of the regular wholesale prices. From June 26, 1919, to September 29, 1920, 39 sales were made, amounting to 358 boxes, containing a total of 679 kuan, besides 15 kuan of low grade opium. The total price paid was Y.920,000 and Y.200,000 was cleared as profits. Of this balance, Y.140,000 was carried by Esaki to Tokio. Out of this latter sum, Y.50,000 was given to Ryokichi Endo, Diet member of the Seiyukai party; Y.60,000 was divided between Saburo Kuniyeda and Esaki himself.

"Then Koga, Nakano, Obata and Kanbara, with a similar method, bought in 21 instalments 785 kuan of opium at Y.280,000, and sold the goods at Y.610,000, obtaining the balance as profits to themselves of Y.320,000. Besides, these men secured 313 kuan of Persian opium in 42 instalments at Y.790,000 and sold the goods at Y.1,010,000, securing the profits of Y.220,000. The two amounts of profits totalled Y.550,000. Of this total, Kangara obtained 80 per cent for himself and the Chinese 20 per cent.

"A number of other big sums are mentioned in the documents. The total loss to the Kuantung government on account of these swindling processes was estimated by the preliminary court at Y.950,000.

"Renzo Koga's alleged crimes cover also a blackmail. Uhei Morishita promised to make a present of 5,000 shares of the

Dairen Produce Exchange Market to Koga, then chief of colonization bureau, for the influence the chief used to have the market permitted. The shares were not forthcoming. So Koga instructed his own son, Kunio, who was then in Dairen, to demand Y.100,000 from Morishita, to which the latter was obliged to agree."

3) Comments by the Ryoto Shimpō.

Mr. Matsuji Mureo, editor of the Ryoto Shimpō, summarizes the case in these words:

"At the 44th session of the Diet, the opposition party vigorously attacked the government on the opium scandal in Kuantung which involved many important Japanese officials in the territory.

"The city government of Dairen formed as the headquarters for selling opium, as it alone had the power to issue special permits for such sales. A tax was levied on these permits. In 1917, Y.5,510,238 worth of opium was sold; in 1918, Y.5,079,646; in 1919, up to March the sum already reached Y.700,000. Just then, the Kenseikai introduced to the Diet a bill to 'regulate the sale of opium.' It was then estimated that the annual sale in Kuantung was Y.5,000,000, and all the taxes thereon went into the government treasury under the name of miscellaneous revenues.

"Opium addicts first see the evil affects of the drug by losing appetite in food. Gradually, their physical strength is weakened, and bodily vigor gives away. Nothing is more tragic in human life than this.

"The census reports of Kuantung show a total of 691,482 inhabitants of whom 78,987 are Japanese, 540 Koreans, 234 foreigners and the remaining 611,730 Chinese. The majority of Chinese are opium smokers. As the sale is done in utmost secrecy, details are heretofore unknown.

"On February 17, 1921, the Kokumin party argued that the government should not levy tax on opium. Civil administration in Kuantung might fail on account of this tax, and with it the emigration policies.

"The sale of opium by government permission is not only against humanity but also impairs the dignity of a civilized nation.

"During the 44th session of the Diet, Baron Fujimura of the Budget Committee in the House of Peers proposes 'a rigid restriction of opium smuggling by government permission.' This bill would apply to opium smuggling in Kuantung, Shan-

tung, Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai and Hankow. He insisted that the government enforce laws against opium smuggling into China in order to uphold the prestige of the nation and reputation of her merchants.

"In Kuantung and in other Japanese consular jurisdictions, morphine smuggling by government permission is an open secret. Therefore, the Chinese are right when they say that Japan is demoralizing permanently their people. Opium smuggling should be stopped at once in order to maintain mutual good feeling between Japan and China."²⁸

4) America's part in the anti-opium movement.

It is a happy remembrance that the United States played an important role in warding off the opium curse from the teeming millions of China. The Harrison Drug Act of 1914 virtually ended the opium traffic in China. But it permitted opium to be exported from United States to countries having laws regulating the use of the drug and its derivatives. As a result, the United States has been a medium for British and Japanese opium smugglers.

To remedy this situation, Senator Wesley L. Jones, of Washington, has recently proposed a bill in the Congress with the purpose of "preventing other countries from using United States as means of shipping opium derivatives to China."

"England has a rather severe law framed after an agreement with China," declares the Senator, "that no British opium should be exported into China, which provides that opium derivatives shall not be shipped in British ships or on British-controlled railroads, except in such amounts as are needed for medicinal purposes.

"The British manufacturers, to circumvent this regulation, have adopted the practice of shipping these narcotics through the United States for re-export to the Orient. They are using our transportation systems to do a class of work of which the Britishers themselves are ashamed. China cured itself of opium smoking. It is now threatened by a more deadly danger—the consumption of opium derivatives which are smuggled into China from Great Britain, the United States, France and Japan. The bill is designed to prevent the United States from being used as a part of the smuggling machine, and to prevent this government from lending itself to a crime that cannot end otherwise than in the ultimate destruction of the Chinese people."

²⁸ The Unsettled Manchuria Problem of Today, June, 1921, pp. 533-538.

5) Opium affects Americans.

A recent report of a Treasury Department Commission shows that thousands of American citizens have become opium addicts, among whom are "schoolboys, schoolgirls, doctors, attorneys, nurses, bankers, business men, army men, housewives, servants, chauffeurs, motormen, engineers and women of high social position. Doctors and nurses furnish more victims proportionately than any other class, according to the testimony of their responsible representatives. Sooner or later the addiction brings the most complete and absolute wrecking of the human being of which we have knowledge. Thousands of confirmed addicts in the United States are already past hope of cure. A public narcotic clinic was carried on for several months in New York City, but it was found entirely inadequate as a method of coping with the appalling problem. Physicians see in the situation the gravest possible menace."

Importation into the United States from 1910 to 1915 averaged 235 tons of opium per year, an average of 36 grains per capita of the population per year. This is 13 to 72 times the amount consumed by other nations such as Austria, Italy, Germany, France and Holland, not taking into account the quantities brought in by smuggling. Even this frightful quantity is on the increase. Importations for 1919 being 365 tons, according to customs reports. This is all rendered into morphine and other opium derivatives and injected into the world's arterial circulation.

Some conception of the quantities of narcotics going from the United States may be gained from figures recently secured from the official records of New York customs house, which have not hitherto been available for publication. They exhibit exports of morphine and cocaine from the Port of New York alone for the years 1918 and 1919 and up to September, 1920, as follows:

Narcotics manufactured in and shipped from New York City:

1918 morphine...	12,304 oz.	1918 cocaine....	43,521 oz.
1919 morphine...	33,696 oz.	1919 cocaine....	38,446 oz.
1920 end Sept...	61,175 oz.	1920 end Sept...	81,042 oz.

Total	107,175 oz.	Total	163,009 oz.
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When one observes that in three-quarters of the present year 61,175 oz. of morphine or two tons were contributed by

this one port and that much larger amounts not yet ascertained were sent out by other ports; and add to this the prodigious amounts shipped through this country by the short and easy methods of bonding and of which no account whatever is made by the American customs;—count this all up and the estimate of 28 tons of morphine for China in a single year is seen to be an entirely reasonable estimate—Far Eastern Fortnightly.

IV. Lack of Justification.

Japanese emigrants have been confronted with several obstacles. Cold regions such as Saghalien and tropical countries such as Orange Free State are not particularly attractive to them since they have shown small capacity to acclimatization.

In recent years, several western nations have passed laws prohibiting Japanese immigration, as if they are retaliating Japan's ancient hostility (in 1640) to immigrants which was couched in these words: "So long as the sun warms the earth any Christian bold enough to come to Japan, even he be King Phillip himself or the God of Christians shall pay for it with his head."

In force of these circumstances, the Mikado's subjects are following the line of least resistance by emigrating to Manchuria, Mongolia, Shantung and Fukien where climate is relatively more agreeable and where folkways and social usages are fundamentally similar to their own.

But what is their ground of justification? The Japanese are not permitted to go to the "white men's lands." Why should they crowd out the Chinese in order that they might live? Indeed, why should the Japanese be permitted to expand at the expense of their blood cousins, the Chinese?

1) Agricultural situation in Japan and China.

Sixty-five per cent of the Japanese people are farmers cultivating on the average 3 acres of land per person. The produce of each cultivated land supports four persons. But the agricultural situation in China is worse. Seventy-eight per cent of the Chinese population is engaged in agricultural pursuits. The average size of a farm in Central China is only about 2 acres. The produce of each tilled land has to support five persons. In China, the economic law of diminishing returns is in active operation.

2) Manchuria and Mongolia as outlets for Chinese emigrants.

Inter-provincial migration in China is now on foot to alleviate the pressure of population in congested districts and to mitigate poverty and misery. Manchuria and Inner Mongolia are the most sparsely populated parts of China. They are natural outlets for Chinese emigrants from other provinces. But Japan is now spreading her "culture" there by extending military power, by undermining Chinese influence and by preventing Chinese exodus. The Japanese are depriving the Chinese of their livelihood. How can they be justified?

V. Rejection of Fundamental Remedies.

1) Economic futility of emigration.

Japan has adopted mass emigration as a principal method of averting the impending danger of over-population. But in the history of migrations, emigration has never appreciably relieved economic pressure of home populations. A rising birth rate usually follows a large outflow of emigrants, as the British emigration during the time of Lord Palmerton. An "Intellectual proletariat" in Germany once forced the graduates of the Charlottenburg Polytechnik (one of the world's finest engineering schools) to be street car conductors. Consequently, thousands of Germans were compelled to seek homes overseas. But an increase of births in the German Empire immediately ensued.

The Irish emigration seems to be an exception to the general rule, as certain parts of Ireland are still sparsely populated. But this is due to severe famines in recent years rather than due to the outflow of Irishmen from the country.

In Japan, the birth rate has been steadily rising. In 1917, the Island Empire recorded a net increase from births of 315,643 males and 297,101 females, surpassing proportionately the birth statistics of all European nations for that year, except Hungary and Roumania. Why, then, should Japan insist on emigration as a means of relieving the population pressure at home?

2) Birth control to check over-population.

A pragmatic remedy for the population problem is found in birth control. This practice recognizes the validity of the Malthusian law that "population, if unchecked, tends to increase faster than food supply" and seeks an adequate remedy. Human propagation is unlimited, but arable land of the earth is limited. G. H. Knibbs, statistician of Australia, has estimated that if the present rate of increase in popula-

tions should persist, the world's supply of food would be exhausted in 496 years.²⁹

Japan's population is taxing the very limits of her food supply. Six millions of her people have to purchase rice, their staple food, from imports of China, British India and French Indo-China. Dry farming is practically unknown in Japan. Mountain terraces which are extensively cultivated in China and the Philippines, are laying in waste in Japan. Throughout the Empire, only 15,000,000 acres of land are now under cultivation. Owing to deep-rooted Japanese folkways and mores, the crown lands may never be opened for agricultural purposes by the masses.

What should Japan do? The futility of emigration as a solution of her population problem is above sketched. Birth control seems to be necessary. By this method a differential birth rate may be worked out whereby sizes of families may be in accordance with family incomes. In other words, the larger the family income the larger should be the family. There will be a direct correlation between socio-economic status of the family and the number of its children. This can only be secured by a volitional limitation of offspring, as it gives parents the power of controlling reproduction.

Today, in Japan as in many another country, the situation is just the reverse. Higher social classes have small families and the wage earners have relatively larger ones. This serious social problem of modernized Japan has not been solved by a mass emigration as above shown, since Japanese wage earners cannot compete successfully with Chinese workers on account of a lower plane of living of the latter.

Yet Japanese statesmen, like Frederick the Great of Prussia, persist in encouraging large families in order to maintain a large army and navy. The official Japan is unequivocally against birth control. Says K. K. Kawakami: "She has not yet produced—she does not care to produce—Margaret Sangers, preaching birth control in the salons of idle society women. Indeed, if the present order of world conditions is to persist, it is open to question whether any nation will be wise in allowing restrictions of the birth rate which will inevitably lessen the number of men available for the defense of its existence."³⁰

²⁹ Census of Commonwealth of Australia, 1911, Appendix A.

³⁰ Yale Rev. vol. 8 (1) N. S. p. 63.

3) Industrialization to solve Japan's population problem.

Japan's ultimate solution and salvation lies in industrialization whereby the plane of living among wage earners may be materially raised, economic wealth and production increased and national catastrophies averted.

Food supply of a nation may be increased in two principal ways: by an extension of land supply and by scientific discoveries in agriculture. The more land is opened for cultivation, the more food the country produces. But a limit may soon be reached where fertile lands will all be used up, and an intensive cultivation on these lands may assure an active operation of the law of diminishing returns. Then the second alternative must come to the rescue. A new mechanical device or invention may materially increase the produce of a cultivated acre and thus defer the operation of the law of diminishing returns. It is quite conceivable that in a nation of genuises the operation of this law may be indefinitely deferred.

This is applicable to industries in general. When a nation lives on imports of various commodities, its people will suffer economically by constant exports of gold. But when the country is industrialized, it can maintain an economic balance in international trade and also meet the demands of its own people. In addition, it can increase productivity to raise appreciably the plane of living of working classes.

Industries in Japan are developing at a rapid rate. Since the war, 300 narikin or mushroom millionaires have been created, and 117 large-scale industries have been developed. The circulation of bank notes in the Japanese market has been quintupled. Taking 1900 as the base year, wholesale prices have been increased 298% in January, 1920, though they are now showing a downward trend. Wages have been keeping pace with the prices. Thus, up to 1915 wages were 49% and prices only 25% higher than those of 1900. Though in recent years prices have increased faster than wages, still labor conditions in Japan are more favorable than in any other Oriental country.

Evidently, in industrialization lies the fundamental solution of Japan's population problem.

VI. New Tendencies of Japanese Emigration.

1) Japanese emigrants in other countries.

In the "Nihon Imin Ron" (The Japanese Emigration Problem) R. Ogawahira has given a retrospect as well as an out-

look of Japanese emigration. For the last 50 years, Japanese colonization is a colossal economic failure. The Mikado's colonizers in various countries have hardly exceeded three millions, of which two millions are in Hokkaido and the remaining are distributed as follows:

Korea, 300,000; Manchuria, 160,000; Hawaii, 80,000; Formosa, 100,000; and Continental U. S., 70,000, etc.

2) South America a new outlet.

New outlets have recently been found for Japan's surplus population. During the world war, coffee and sugar plantations in South America, particularly in Chile and Brazil, have been in urgent need of Japanese laborers.

Three largest emigration companies in Japan, namely, the Morioka Emigration Company, the Toyo Imin Goshi Kaisha and the Nanbei, are attracting Japanese farmers to South America. They have agencies in the principal cities of each province, especially in Hiroshima, Kynshu and Fukushima which are noted for sending out emigrants to various countries. Inquiries are answered, bulletins posted and speeches on South America are made in villages that seem promising fields for recruits.

3) Okuma on South America.

In South America, Brazil is indeed a new Promised Land of the Japanese emigrants as it has a density of only six persons as against 356 per square miles in Japan. Writing in the Chuo Koron, Okuma said recently: "As to the countries to be selected, I am in favor of South America, where the Japanese are welcomed, where the soil is rich, and many of the customs of the people resemble ours. There is plenty of room for millions of Japanese in that part of the world." To give the emigrant an adequate educational equipment, the Yokohama Training School, supported by the Japan Emigration Society, is rendering its most valuable service to the emigrants.

The Brazilian Government is co-operating with the Japanese Emigration Companies, the Japanese Government with the emigrants, and the steamship companies with both governments and emigration companies, in a concentrated effort to stimulate colonization. The Japanese Government is offering each of the emigrants leaving for Brazil a bonus of 80 yen as an incentive toward emigration.

4) Japan's emigration to Peru and Chile.

The Toyo Kisen Kaisha service to Peru and Chile has been heavily subsidized since 1908. Recently, the company has

further augmented its services by three new ships touching at Hongkong, Corone], Chile and the west coast of South America. Before the war, there were no regular schedules for the steamers from Japan to South America; now there is a monthly service with steamers of a tonnage from 15,000 to 20,000 tons. The Osaka Shosen Kaisha has also a new line between Japan and Brazil and Argentina via Cape Town.

5) Japan's emigration to Brazil.

The Sao Paulo State Government of Brazil recently entered into a contract with the three authorized Japanese emigration companies to be supplied with 10,000 emigrants annually. In return Sao Paulo puts the Japanese emigrant on the same footing with a European laborer with power to lease or own land; offers free railway passes through the state; the privilege of being quartered at the government emigration boarding houses; and partly paid passage to Japan. These terms, with the land ownership privilege, are much more generous than those obtained by the Brazilian Colonization Company which was founded in 1912 by Prince Katsura, Baron Shibusawa and others with a capital of a million yen. At that time, they had to be content with 12,500 acres of land, and were obliged to bring 2,000 families to the colony within 5 years of signing the contract.

The Brazil Colonizing Company is looking for able bodied men between 20 and 45, preferable with children, all of whom must be over 12. The company gives the colonizers 20 cho of land, which they can pay in easy instalments, and advance passage and other money, lends farming implements, provides medical care, and has even built a rice factory.

The Morioka Emigration Company sends contract labor to Peru. The Peruvian Sugar Company, Ltd., with its main office in London and a branch in Lima, pays wages of one yen and twenty sen a day, the women receiving the same wages as men. When the laborer has worked 500 days, he gets a bonus of 50 yen. The hours are 10 in the field and 12 in the factory, with Sundays off and numerous holidays.³¹

South America, not China, offers Japan an outlet for her surplus population.

VII. Economic Imperialism.

1) Recent acquisitions of Japan.

Japanese colonization aims more at acquiring raw materials,

³¹ Asia, vol. 17, pp. 722-728.

minerals and economic privileges, than the mere outlets for her surplus population. Before the World War, the German Potash Trust, with the aid of the Starssfurt and Alastian potash deposits, monopolized potash exports to Japan. The outbreak of hostilities in Europe cut off the German supply of potash for Japanese markets. The Island Empire was therefore anxious to acquire Marshall Islands in order to get enough potash as fertilizers for her rice fields.

The Caroline Islands which consist of about 500 coral islets are rich for phosphate deposits, especially in the island of Yap. Besides, they produce cocoanuts, white yams, potatoes, bread fruit and other tropical fruits. All are useful for Japanese traders.

Japan's dominance in the Han Yeh Ping Iron Works, a Sino-Japanese corporation in Hupeh province, gives her unrivalled privileges of acquiring iron and steel from China. Japan is now monopolizing the export of soya beans, wheat and bean cakes in Manchuria. Six large coal mines in Shantung, now being worked by the Japanese, are supplying the daily needs of factories in Kobe and Osaka.

Japanese colonizers scramble for economic privileges and rights wherever they go. In this respect, they have amply caught the spirit of modern capitalistic imperialism. Characterizing Japan's desires for economic expansion, Dr. Ernest Grünfeld says; "Man wusste bereits, dass nicht jeder, der sein Vaterland verlässt, um auf unbestimmte Zeit, ja auf immer in die ferne zu ziehen, ein bemitleidenswerter Flüchtling, ein verächtlicher Abenteurer oder ein bedauernswertes Opfer von Agenten und Rhedern ist, dass Auswanderung nicht nur einen Verlust an Soldaten, Arbeitern und Capital bedeutet, sondern der Ausbreitung des eignen Volkstums, des Handels und der Schifffahrt Ansichten eröffnet, ja in letzter Zeit sogar zu einer Quelle reichlicher Geldsungen aus dem Ausland geworden ist, die für kapitalarme Länder eine grosse Rolle spielen."³²

2) Emancipation of Asia

Today, the emigration problem has further intensified the clash between "humanité du pain" and "humanité du riz." Faced with an economic necessity, bread must be won at the sacrifice of rights. Japan is carrying on this struggle in the name of an economic emancipation for all Asia. "Five hun-

³² Die Japanische Auswanderung, p. 8.

dred and ninety-seven million colored peoples are now under the rules of the whites," declares Dr. Masao Matsuka. "Since Asia constitutes 33% of the land area of the earth, and since several peoples of the continent are undergoing an industrial evolution, economic emancipation for them is a necessity."³³

VIII. Conclusions.

The above exposé of Japanese secret documents and confidential reports reveals in a general way the hidden motives of Japanese emigration to China. Military and territorial considerations predominate socio-economic improvements of the Mikado's subjects. A. Morgan Young, editor of the *Japan Chronicle*, sees the situation clearly when he says that "the Japanese population on the (Asiatic) mainland remains intensively Japanese. It is the militaristic ideal, and even a cultural ideal, to have a great Japanese Empire in Eastern Asia of which the islands constituting Japan proper shall be only an outpost. The Japanese showed a perfect willingness to die in Manchuria. They have yet to show a willingness to live there."³⁴

Japanese emigrants are carrying their "culture" to their new homes in three principal ways: by force of arms, by an elimination of native participation in industries through underhanded methods and by an extension of consular jurisdiction.

Economic aspects of Japanese emigration have not been hopeful. On the other hand, their demoralizing influence upon Chinese communities is immense. Says Matsuji Mureo, editor of the *Ryoto Shimpō*: "A successful emigration will assure Japan's economic independence, and national safety and glory. But since the South Manchuria question and the Port Arthur opium scandal, the Japanese government was severely attacked by the opposition party in the House of Commons. Our colonization of seventeen years in Manchuria has resulted in a complete failure. Our government is now awakened to this overwhelming defeat, and the whole world knows the ill-reputable acts of Japan in that territory."³⁵

While China is more crowded than Japan, South America opens new outlets for the Mikado's colonizers. In this direction lies a true hope for solving the surplus population problem of Japan. South America and the Island Empire will be

³³ My View of the Emigration Problem, Sept., 1921, pp. 30-31.

³⁴ August 20, 1920.

³⁵ The Unsettled Manchuria Question of Today, p. 29.

mutually benefited by this emigration. In this economic expansion, the East shall eventually meet the West:

“Le temps n’est plus où l’Europeen se plaignait de l’isolement des Chinois, des Japonais et des Coréens, de leur entêtement à fermer les frontières—Les rôles sont reversés; c’est le monde jaune qui cherche à empiéter sur les terres d’autrui et c’est le tour des Occidentaux de défendre leurs territoires.”³⁶

³⁶ Américains et Japonais, Louis Aubert.

For additional copies, write to
THE CHINA ADVOCATE,
542 Munsey Building, Washington, D. C.,

or to

MR. TA CHEN,
Care 2312 19th St., N. W.,
Washington, D. C.